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Abstract
This paper analyses the gender dimension of intergenerational transfers in 15 
European countries using National Transfer Accounts (NTA) data on age- and gender-
specific transfers in 2010. We combine NTA data with information from life tables to 
derive measures of gender-specific net transfers over the whole life course and by life 
stages. The analysis distinguishes between public and private transfer flows, and 
accounts for transfers of services produced by unpaid work. Furthermore, we analyse 
public transfers in more detail by decomposing public old-age benefits into yearly 
averages and the number of years that individuals can expect to be net recipients. In all 
analysed countries, men contribute more to public transfers and finance a larger 
proportion of consumption needs of children, compared to women. By contrast, 
women provide most of the transfers of services produced by unpaid work, such as 
childcare and household work. While yearly net public benefits in old age are 
considerably smaller for women in most countries, total public benefits over the whole 
retirement period are higher for women due to their higher life expectancy.
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1 Introduction
Economic transfers between generations are essential elements of society. Typical for 
the human life course are periods of dependency in childhood and old age, 
characterised by consumption exceeding production. A large part of the consumption 
needs in childhood and old age are covered by transfers between generations.5 In 
Europe, intra-family transfers from parents play the most important role for children, 
while the needs of the retired population are mainly covered by public transfers. 
Men and women differ considerably in their roles as providers and recipients of 
intergenerational transfers. Men are characterised by higher employment rates and 
higher income than women. For example, in Austria, Germany, Italy and the UK, men 
generated about two-thirds of total labour income in 2010. In Slovenia, the country 
with the lowest gender differences in average labour income, men still generated about 
55 per cent of total labour income (Hammer, Prskawetz and Freund 2015). 
Consequently, men pay a higher share of income-based taxes and social contributions, 
thereby providing a larger proportion of public transfers to the elderly generation. 
Because of their higher labour income, men also finance a larger share of the 
consumption needs of children.
Unpaid household work and childcare also constitute important intergenerational 
transfers. These activities are mainly carried out by women, who are net providers of 
unpaid services to children and other adult household members. Vargha, Gál, and 
Crosby-Nagy (2017) estimate that working-age women carry out 2–4 hours of unpaid 
work each day for other household members. Transfer contributions in form of unpaid 
work vary substantially between European countries and are found to be particularly 
5 A transfer is defined as transaction in which a person provides a good or service to another person 
without receiving from the latter any good, service or asset in return as counterpart. Important 
intergenerational transfers are the parents’ care for their children; goods, services and monetary 
transfers provided to children; publicly financed education, pensions, health and long-term care. 
large for women in Italy and Spain, corresponding to about 4 hours of unpaid work 
throughout the entire working age. 
The specialisation of women in unpaid work is among the main determinants for the 
lower pensions of women in most European countries. Having a child is usually 
associated with an increase of unpaid work for women, along with a reduction of paid 
work, lower contributions to the pension system and consequently lower pensions 
(Blau and Kahn 2017). Overall, European women aged 65+ received 39 per cent less 
pension than men in 2009. The calculation of this gap includes persons without own 
pension. The pension gap is found to be lowest in most former socialist countries, 
where the difference between average male and female pension income in the elderly 
population 65+ is 20 per cent and less (Bettio, Tinios and Betti 2013). During 
socialism, the participation of women in paid work was encouraged, resulting in 
smaller differences between the careers of men and women. By contrast, in 
Luxembourg, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Spain and Malta, the gender gap in pension 
income is 45 per cent or more.  
While average yearly pensions are lower for women, they are net receivers of public 
transfers for a much longer period than men. In most European countries, women 
retire considerably earlier than men (OECD 2019a) but have a much higher life 
expectancy. The average difference between male and female life expectancy at age 60 
in the European Union is four years (Eurostat 2019a). It is therefore important to 
differentiate between yearly net benefits and the accumulated net benefits over a 
lifetime when analysing gender inequalities in the intergenerational transfer system.
For this analysis, we measure and analyse gender differences in transfer contributions 
and benefits at each life stage and over lifetime for 15 European countries. In 
particular, we address the following two research questions: (i) How large are gender 
differences in net intergenerational transfers over lifetime when all types of transfers 
are considered, including transfers in form of unpaid work? (ii) Does the public 
transfer system advantage men or women when life expectancy is taken into account? 
This is the first paper that uses the comprehensive European National Transfer 
Accounts data for analysing gender-specific intergenerational transfers. It contributes 
to the discussion on gender equality in the transfer system by measuring transfers in 
form of unpaid work and by quantifying the effect of gender differences in life 
expectancy on transfers over lifetime. Even when women and men receive about the 
same amount of public transfers in lifetime terms, it is still problematic if they have to 
live from much lower yearly pensions than men and face a higher risk of poverty in 
old age (Eurostat 2015). On the other hand, men spend and enjoy a much lower 
number of years in retirement than women, despite their substantial contribution to the 
transfer system. It is important to explore gender inequalities considering differences 
in the level and duration of public old-age benefits. Especially, since these dimensions 
are crucial levers for adjusting the public transfer system in the context of population 
ageing. 
2 Data
National Transfer Accounts (NTAs) are an accounting framework that provides 
comprehensive and detailed information on the age patterns of production, 
consumption and saving, and on transfers between age groups (Lee and Mason 2011, 
UN 2013). A novelty of the NTA system are estimates of intergenerational transfers 
within households. The basic NTA data consists of a range of age profiles, containing 
the per-capita averages of income, transfer payments and benefits, consumption and 
saving by age. Recent work extended the NTA system by gender-specific information. 
So-called National Time Transfer Accounts (NTTAs) complement the basic NTA 
system by providing age and gender-specific information on unpaid work. NTTAs are 
based on time use data and contain estimates of production, transfers and consumption 
of services that are produced by unpaid work (Donehower 2019). They measure how 
much time men and women use to produce services for other generations and genders. 
Three types of transfers can be distinguished in NTAs and NTTAs: (i) public transfers, 
including pensions, health services and education as largest components; (ii) private 
market transfers, consisting predominantly of goods and services that are bought on 
the market and provided to other household members, mostly to children; and (iii) 
private non-market transfers, which consist of goods and services produced by unpaid 
work.  Both types of private transfer consist mainly of the provision of goods and 
services to other household members. The term market transfers emphasises that what 
are transferred are goods and services that are acquired through market transactions, 
including the generation of income and the purchase of the goods. Non-market 
transfers do not involve market transactions; they consist of goods and services that 
are produced within households for own consumption or provided free of charge to 
other households. In our paper we refer mostly to net transfers, defined as transfer 
benefits less transfer contributions.
NTAs and NTTAs together provide comprehensive information on public and private 
transfers between age groups and genders. So far, research using both NTAs and 
NTTAs focused on single countries, including Germany (Kluge 2014), Spain (Rentería 
et al. 2016), Italy (Zannella 2015), Hungary (Gál, Szabó & Vargha 2015) and Austria 
(Hammer 2014). Hammer et al. (2015) combined the data from several countries but 
focus only on production. To combine the monetary flows in NTAs with the NTTAs 
measures in form of time, the NTTA quantities are valued with the wages that could be 
earned on the labour market with similar activities. 
The most striking results from research using NTAs and NTTAs are the huge 
differences in the gender-specific levels of transfers and the large share of production 
that is provided to other generations by those at age 30–45. Germany and Austria are 
characterised by large gender differences in paid work and income, but with similar 
amounts of time devoted to total work (paid and unpaid). However, the estimates of 
the monetary value of contributions to intergenerational transfers are considerably 
lower for women. Among the explanations are lower-than-average wage rates for 
household services und childcare, and consequently a lower value of private non-
market transfers. Also, Italy and Spain are characterised by a much lower income of 
women, compared to men. However, because of high levels of unpaid work and 
private non-market transfers of women, in Italy and Spain the estimated value of 
female contributions to intergenerational transfers is higher than the male estimate. In 
Slovenia the gender differences in labour income are low, because of high full-time 
employment rates of women (Hammer et al. 2015; Sambt et al. 2016). Despite the 
similar levels of paid work of men and women, Slovenian women contribute 
considerably more time to unpaid work than men. In total they devote more time to 
work and make a higher contribution to intergenerational transfers. In all countries the 
size of intergenerational transfers shows a typical life course pattern. Contributions 
peak at age 30–40 when a large share of the population has care responsibilities for 
young children. It is also the age group which devote the highest amount of time to 
work (Zannella et al. 2018). 
2.1 European National Transfer Accounts
Gender-specific NTA and NTTA data for 15 European countries provide the basis for 
the analysis of intergenerational transfers in this paper. The European NTA and NTTA 
data have been created as part of the AGENTA research project and are based on 
harmonised European micro-data to facilitate cross-country comparisons.6 A detailed 
description of the European NTA data and the methodology can be found in Istenič et 
al. (2016). European NTTA data are described by Vargha et al. (2017). In this paper 
we use the countries for which both European NTA and NTTA data are available.7 
Additionally, NTTAs for Austria in 2008 have been calculated by the authors. 
6 Information about AGENTA can be found at www.agenta-project.eu. European National Transfer 
Accounts data can be accessed at www.wittgensteincentre.org/ntadata.  
7 We did not include Denmark. Contrary to other countries, the asset income in EU-SILC for Denmark 
includes profits and losses. We suspect that this difference results in incomparable estimates of gender-
specific public transfers. 
Included in our analysis are therefore Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), 
Germany (DE), Estonia (EE), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Italy (IT), 
Lithuania (LT), Latvia (LV), Poland (PL), Sweden (SE), Slovenia (SI) and the United 
Kingdom (UK). In the remaining part of the text this group of countries is referred to 
as EU-15. 
Understanding gender-specific estimates of NTAs and NTTAs requires some 
knowledge of the methodology. In general, three steps can be distinguished in the 
compilation of NTAs. First, the quantities of income, transfers, consumption and 
saving for the total economy are derived from National Accounts and related data. 
Second, the distribution of those quantities over age groups is estimated using survey 
data and administrative data. Third, the household structure as given in the survey 
data, as well as the results from the previous two steps, are used to estimate private 
transfers within households. Not all of the NTA quantities can be unambiguously 
assigned to a certain gender and a certain age group. To allocate consumption and 
asset income to age groups, NTAs use a range of different rules and methods.
The allocation of consumption to individuals makes use of assumptions. For collective 
public consumption the NTA methodology assumes that everyone consumes the same 
amount, independent of age and gender. Data on private consumption are only 
available at household level. For the allocation of private consumption to individuals 
within households, NTAs use an age-specific equivalence scale. All household 
members of age 20 and older are assumed to consume the same share of total 
consumption of the household. Children until the age of 4 are assumed to consume 40 
per cent of an adult member’s share. For ages between 4 and 20 the NTA equivalence 
scale assumes a linear increase of the consumption share. 
The estimates of intra-household market transfers are built on the difference between 
consumption and disposable income. It is assumed that the consumption of household 
members without income, or whose income falls short of consumption, is covered 
through transfers from other household members. The NTA transfer estimates reflect 
the household structure and the distribution income within households but cannot 
identify an unequal distribution of consumption between men and women within 
households. 
Private asset income, which is also given only at household level, is assigned to the 
household head. Since earnings are the most important criterion in identifying the 
household head, the head is more likely to be male than female. Few data allow to 
assess this assumption. Groiß et al. (2017) find for Austria that in most households, 
assets are shared equally among couples. However, they show also that particularly 
valuable assets are more likely to belong to men. Consequently, men indeed own a 
considerably higher share of total assets and pay more of the taxes on asset income. 
The NTA rules for allocating asset income could bias gender-specific results. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of more detailed, individual data, the allocation of asset 
income to the household head seems to be the best approximation of the ownership 
structure of assets. 
The age- and gender-specific estimates of production, transfers and consumption in 
NTTAs are based on time use data. The most important types of production captured 
in NTTAs are care services and household work. The age groups and genders that 
consume most of the care services can be identified with relative accuracy in the 
surveys, as there are usually only one or very few persons in a household who qualify 
as care consumers. For general household services it is not possible to identify the 
amount that certain household members consume. NTTAs use the assumption that 
each household member profits equally from these services. Age-specific consumption 
of household services is estimated by adding the time use for unpaid production of all 
household members and distributing it to all of them in equal shares. Private non-
market transfers are calculated as difference between production and consumption. 
Most of the time use surveys used in NTTA do not refer to our reference year 2010. 
We assume that the structure of time use in the survey year also represents the 
structure of time use in 2010.
2.2 Combining paid and unpaid work
The combination of transfer data from NTAs and NTTAs requires their transformation 
into the same units. European NTAs are measured in Euro, while NTTAs are 
measured in minutes per day. Two alternative ways of transforming and comparing 
NTAs and NTTAs are used in the paper. 
First, we transform non-market transfers into monetary units by valuing them with the 
average hourly net wage of a full-time worker. The valuation of unpaid work is a 
controversial topic (Varjonen et al. 2014). Should unpaid work be rated with the wage 
of a specialist, e.g. that of a cook, cleaner or nanny, or with the wage of a general 
housekeeper? Should gross or net wages be used? So far, there is no consensus in the 
research community on which wage rate is more appropriate. Poissonnier and Roy 
(2017) find that the choice of occupation makes little difference. However, the 
estimated values of unpaid work are about 40 per cent lower when net income is used 
to value unpaid work, compared to the use of gross income. No publicly available data 
source offers information on occupation-specific wage rates for all analysed countries. 
We therefore decided for average wages, which can be calculated from our NTA data 
source together with data on total working hours in the economy. The use of net wages 
can be regarded as a lower bound of alternative valuations of unpaid work in relation 
to paid work. 
Second, we transform the transfers measured in money into time units. Public transfers 
and private market transfers are valued by the amount of time that an average person 
needs to work in employment to generate enough income to finance these transfers. 
This novel approach provides an intuitive measure of intergenerational support that 
can be easily compared across countries. Usual valuations of unpaid work, such as 
wages of a household specialist, result in a lower valuation of unpaid work compared 
to paid work, since wages for household work are below average wages.  The 
approach of valuing all types of transfers equally in terms of time can be regarded as 
upper bound in the valuation of unpaid work relative to paid work.
2.3 Overview: age- and gender-specific transfers in Europe 
We standardise the transfer measure in monetary units to facilitate comparisons across 
countries. In this paper the transfers in terms of money are measured as shares of the 
average yearly labour income of a full-time worker (YL) in each country. The average 
income of a full-time worker is estimated by dividing total labour income in the 
economy, as reported in National Accounts, by an estimate of the number of workers 
in full-time equivalents, taken from Eurostat (2010). 
Figure 1 plots age-specific per-capita averages of net transfers by type and gender in 
the EU-15. The left panel shows the transfers in monetary terms, the right panel the 
transfers in form of time. Public transfers are in black, private market transfers in dark-
grey and private non-market transfers in light-grey. Positive values indicate net 
transfer benefits, negative values net transfer contributions. The upper panel shows 
age-specific intergenerational transfers by type, not distinguishing by gender. 
For children, the most important type of transfers are private non-market transfers, 
while public transfers are most important for elderly persons. Some general patterns in 
the transfer flows between generations are similar in all countries. Children and young 
adults are net receivers of transfers until their early twenties. The most important 
transfer component for children is private non-market transfers. At age 0 and age 1 the 
yearly value of the transfers amounts to 1.2 YL or about 8 hours of work per day. 
Total net transfers decrease with the age of children, because they demand less time. 
At age 23, total net transfer contributions become positive. The peak in providing 
transfers is at ages 35 to 40, when a large share of the population devotes time and 
income to their own children. All types of transfers considered, the value of net 
transfer payments in prime working age lies between 0.4 YL and 0.6 YL. In terms of 
time, they correspond to 3-4 hours of work per day. The population of age 60 and 
older are net receivers of intergenerational transfers, consisting mostly of public 
transfers. These transfers correspond to about 2-3 hours of work per day. 
Men provide most of the public transfers and the private market transfers, women the 
transfers of services produced by unpaid work. The panels in the second and third row 
in Figure 1 show the age-specific values by gender as average of the EU-15. There are 
few gender differences in net transfer benefits received in childhood. However, at 
working age and old age we observe some clear gender differences: while men provide 
most of the public and the private market transfers, women provide most of the non-
market transfers in the form of unpaid work. Old age benefits consist mainly of public 
transfers, being somewhat smaller for women than for men. Even in old age women 
are net providers of private non-market transfers, while men are net providers of 
private market transfers.
Figure 1: Age-specific net transfers by age and type of transfer in 2010, 
simple average of the EU-15
3 Methodology
We generate a gender-specific measure of net transfers that a hypothetical person pays 
and receives over his or her entire lifetime, given the age-specific transfer pattern in 
2010. The measure is based on a thought experiment. It is assumed that the age- and 
gender-specific patterns of transfers observed in 2010 correspond to the life course 
patterns of a hypothetical male and female individual. The transfers at each age are 
weighted with age-specific survival probabilities (Eurostat 2017). To indicate the 
adjustment for survival probability we use the term expected transfers. We then 
calculate (i) the expected amount of net transfers that men and women receive in 
childhood, (ii) the expected amount they provide to children, the elderly population, 
and to their partners during working life, and (iii) the expected amount they receive in 
old age. As mentioned above, net transfers refer to benefits less contributions. The life 
stages childhood and old age refer to age groups that are characterised by positive net 
transfers. Working age is characterised by negative net transfers, i.e. positive net 
contributions. A similar approach is used in Hammer, Istenič and Vargha (2018), 
without distinguishing between genders. 
The values of total expected net transfers by life stage are calculated as the sum of age-
specific net transfers over all age groups belonging to the respective life stage, 
weighted by survival probability. Total expected net transfers received by an 
individual of gender  in childhood are denoted by  and calculated as the sum 𝑔 𝑇𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔,𝑔
of net transfers per capita at all young ages with positive net transfer benefits 
(Equation 1). The term  represents the net public transfer of gender  at age i. The 𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑔 𝑔
term  denotes net private market transfers and the term  represents net 𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑔 𝑇𝑁𝑀𝑖,𝑔
private non-market transfers. Childhood includes all young ages characterised by 
positive net total transfers. The term  refers to the oldest age belonging to childhood 𝑙𝑔
for gender . On average in the EU-15, childhood includes all ages from zero to age 𝑔
23 for women and age 24 for men. The measure of expected net transfers paid during 
working age  is calculated as the sum of net transfers over all age groups 𝑇𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘,𝑔
characterised by negative net transfers, i.e. positive net transfer contributions 
(Equation 2). Working age ranges from  to , with  referring to the 𝑙𝑔 +1 𝑢𝑔 ―1 𝑢𝑔
youngest age group in old age that is characterised by positive net transfers. The 
simple average of age  in the EU-15 is 62 years for men and women. Gender-𝑢𝑔
specific expected transfers in old age  are calculated as sum over all age groups 𝑇𝑜𝑙𝑑,𝑔
from  up to 80 (Equation 3). In European NTAs, transfer data in single ages are only 𝑢𝑔
available until age 79. The age group 80 includes the averages for all individuals of 
age 80 and older. The  stands for the gender-specific survival probabilities until age 𝑆𝑖,𝑔
, calculated from cross-sectional mortality data. For  the  represent life 𝑖 𝑖 = 80 𝑆𝑖,𝑔
expectancy at age 80, given the mortality rates of 2010. 
             (1)𝑇𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔,𝑔 = ∑𝑙𝑔𝑖 = 0(𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑔 + 𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑔 + 𝑇𝑁𝑀𝑖,𝑔) ∗ 𝑆𝑖,𝑔
(total expected net transfers received in childhood, which lasts from age 0 to age )𝑙𝑔
(2)𝑇𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘,𝑔 = ∑𝑢𝑔 ― 1𝑖 = 𝑙𝑔 + 1(𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑔 + 𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑔 + 𝑇𝑁𝑀𝑖,𝑔) ∗ 𝑆𝑖,𝑔
(total expected net transfers paid in working age, lasting from age  to age )𝑙𝑔 +1 𝑢𝑔 ―1
             (3)𝑇𝑜𝑙𝑑,𝑔 = ∑80𝑖 = 𝑢𝑔(𝑇𝑃𝑖,𝑔 + 𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑔 + 𝑇𝑁𝑀𝑖,𝑔) ∗ 𝑆𝑖,𝑔
(total expected net transfers received in old age, lasting from age  to death)𝑢𝑔
It is important to keep in mind that these measures do not refer to a certain individual 
or a member of a certain cohort. Measuring transfers over the whole life would require 
longitudinal data covering the whole life course of a generation. The measure 
generated by this thought experiment is designed to provide insights into the gender-
specific cross-sectional age pattern of transfers in 2010. It allows a comparison of 
important characteristics of the intergenerational transfer system across countries. 
Regarding the estimates of transfers, it is important to know that for the total 
population the contributions and benefits of private market transfers and public 
transfers are not necessarily equal. For private market transfers, the differences 
between total contributions and benefits are small in most countries and mainly reflect 
remittances. For public transfers, total contributions and benefits can differ 
considerably. First, they involve flows between countries. Second, in most countries 
part of public net benefits is financed through public debt, which increases benefits 
relative to contributions.
The measurement of transfers relative to labour income corresponds to discounting of 
nominal age-specific transfers by growth rates of labour income. Similar analysis often 
applies discount rates that exceed the growth labour income, accounting for time 
preference of individuals. The discounted values reflect the value of an expected 
transfer stream for the individual, giving net transfers that are paid or received in near 
future a higher weight. In the context of generational accounting (Auerbach et al. 
1991, Lee et al. 2017), the discounted value of expected transfers is interpreted as the 
amount of net wealth that is required at birth to generate the same stream of income as 
the expected net transfers. In this context, the discount rate also captures the risk-free 
interest that is earned/paid on net wealth. Our focus is on the value/costs of gender-
specific transfer streams for society. Men and women differ in the amount of net 
transfers received in old age, with women having lower pensions but higher life 
expectancy. These differences would be reduced by discounting, because the transfers 
received in old age would be discounted most. However, society needs to provide 
these old age transfers. Differences between men and women should be fully included 
in our measure. The use of discount rates that reflect time preferences of individuals is 
therefore not appropriate in our analysis.
However, given that the risk-free interest rate is currently around zero in Europe, the 
distinct interpretations of expected net transfers over lifetime do not exclude each 
other. We assume that the low interest rates are not only a phenomenon of expansive 
monetary policy but do reflect the time preference of individuals. Thus, the value of 
net transfers over lifetime can be interpreted as benefit/cost for society, as the present 
value of the transfer stream for an individual at birth, and as the amount of net wealth 
that is required at birth to generate an income stream corresponding to the flow of net 
transfers.  
The size and sign of expected transfers depend on the population structure (Lee & 
Mason 2011, chapter 2). Most private transfers are provided by parents to their own 
children. In stable declining populations with a fertility below two, expected net 
transfers benefits in the private system are positive: the transfers provided by two 
persons in working age are shared among less than two children. By contrast, in 
Europe, public transfers are predominantly directed at the elderly population. In stable 
growing populations, the transfer benefits of the elderly population are financed by a 
large working age population, reducing the burden for each person in working age. 
Consequently, expected net transfers in the public system are positive in growing 
populations.
To summarise: a declining population results in positive expected net transfers in the 
private system, whereas a growing population results in positive expected net transfers 
in the public system.  European countries experienced a baby boom between 1950 and 
1970 in most countries, in Spain and Portugal the boom lasted until the 1980s. 
Consequently, summing the population in the 15 countries, the cohorts around age 45 
were the most populous in 2010. The parents of the baby boomers and elderly 
population in 2010 are characterised by high fertility of about 3 children per women. 
On the contrary, the baby boomers themselves and the younger cohorts are 
characterised by below-replacement fertility. The demographic structure with baby 
boomers in working age corresponds to a growing population for transfers to the 
elderly and a declining population for transfers to children. Consequently, both 
expected public and expected private net transfer benefits are predicted to be positive 
in all analysed countries.
4 Results
Remarkable aspects of the expected net transfers over lifetime are the large positive 
values for both men and women and the large differences in gender patterns across 
countries. Detailed estimates of expected net transfers in money units are reported in 
Table 1. They include information by type of transfers, life stages and gender. To 
make the monetary values comparable across countries and years, they are measured 
in country-specific averages of the yearly income of a full-time worker (YL), just as in 
the previous section.  Beside expected net transfers, the table reports the gender-
specific age borders for each life stage. Total values of expected net transfers 
measured in time are provided in Table 2, the details by type of transfers and the age 
borders are found in Table A1 in the appendix. The expected transfers in time units are 
measured in terms of time that a full-time employee uses for paid work within a year 
(TL).8 The abbreviation YL refers to income from labour, while the abbreviation TL 
refers to time use for (paid) labour, both referring to yearly values.  
4.1 Net transfers by life stages
The EU-15 simple average of expected transfer benefits in childhood amounts to 17 
YL for males and 16 YL for females. The largest component are private non-market 
transfers with a value of 8/7 YL (men/women), followed by private market transfers 
with a value of 5/5 YL and public transfers with a value of about 3/4 YL. In terms of 
time, the total expected transfers received in childhood amount to 23 TL for women 
and 25 TL for men. Because the structure of transfers received by men and women in 
8 We assume that the number of hours used for work are 1870 per year. We use the average working 
hours across European OECD countries, which is 1630 hours (OECD 2019a). 15 percent are added, 
corresponding to the average amount of time that is used for work-related travel (Eurostat 2019b). 
childhood are very similar, the valuation methods for market transfers and non-market 
transfers have little effect on gender-specific results. 
Intergenerational transfers received by children vary considerably across countries. 
Total expected transfers received in childhood range between 13 YL for men and 
women in Belgium and France, and more than 21 YL for men in Bulgaria and Poland. 
These differences suggest that in countries and periods with low fertility, such as in 
Bulgaria and Poland from about 1995 to 2010 (Eurostat 2018), transfer benefits per 
child are high because the total transfers to children are shared among comparably 
fewer individuals (see also Vargha and Donehower 2019). 
The gender-specific expected transfer contributions in working age reflect the 
specialisation of men in paid work and women in unpaid work. In the EU-15, the 
average value of expected net transfer contributions in working age amounts to 15 YL 
for men and women. Net contributions to private market transfers amount to 7 YL for 
men and 0 YL for women, the net contributions to public transfers to 8/4 YL. By 
contrast, women provide 11 YL non-market net transfers during working age, men 
zero. Measurement in terms of time, which gives the time used for unpaid work and 
paid work the same value, results in higher expected transfer contributions of women 
with 24 TL, compared to men with 20 TL. The higher value for women is due to the 
much larger amount of time that women use for work activities in some of the 
countries.  
Total expected transfer contributions of men in working age range from 8 YL in Latvia 
and Lithuania to 20 in Austria and Sweden. These differences are largely driven by 
public transfers. In Latvia and Lithuania, public dissaving reduced contributions 
relative to benefits. In contrast Austria’s public dissaving is modest, while Sweden is 
the only country with positive public saving. Furthermore, both Austria and Sweden 
are characterised by high taxes on labour and a pronounced intergenerational 
redistribution by the public sector. For women, the total transfer contributions by 
women range from 11 YL in Germany to 17 YL in Spain and Italy, and 18 YL in 
Slovenia. Female contributions are high in countries where women devote a 
considerably larger amount of time to paid and unpaid work combined. The gender 
patterns are similar when measured in time units. The higher valuation of non-market 
transfers result in even more pronounced gender differences in countries with high 
contributions of women to non-market transfers, such as in Italy, Spain and Slovenia. 
Nevertheless, in Austria, Germany, Sweden and the UK, women contribute less to the 
transfer system than men, despite the equal valuation of paid and unpaid work. These 
countries are characterised by a gender-equal distribution of total working time, i.e. 
paid and unpaid work, and large gender differences in labour income. The results 
suggest that unpaid work is less redistributive than paid work, i.e. a larger share of 
goods and services produced by paid work is redistributed between generations and 
genders, compared to unpaid work. This result is reasonable and can be illustrated 
using single households: singles do pay taxes and social contributions, of which a large 
part is redistributed to other generations. However, they consume all their unpaid work 
by themselves. All households redistribute via paid work and public transfers. By 
contrast, the only households with considerable intergenerational redistribution via 
unpaid work are family households with small children.  
Expected net transfer received in old age are much smaller as compared to net 
transfers received by children and consist almost exclusively of public transfers. In old 
age, the expected transfers received amount to 5 YL for men and 6 YL for women. In 
most countries, the total value of expected public transfer received by women in old 
age is about equal or higher for women compared to men. The results indicate that the 
public pension system disadvantages women by ignoring intergenerational transfers to 
children, but that their higher life expectancy might compensate this disadvantage. The 
valuation in terms of time results in a higher valuation of net non-market transfers 
from women to men. In time units, women receive the same amount net transfers in 
old age compared to men (8/8 TL). 
On average, men are net contributors to intergenerational transfers from age 25 to age 
61, women from age 24 to age 61. The age borders vary considerably across countries. 
Childhood lasts from birth to age 22 for men in Austria to age 27 for men in Spain. In 
some countries women become net contributors a little earlier than men, because they 
are younger when they have children and become net contributors as mothers. The last 
year of working age is 59 for women in Poland and 66 for men in Sweden. In countries 
where women provide large amounts of unpaid work, such as Italy and Spain, the age 
border for entering old age is higher for women compared to men. In countries with 
moderate levels of unpaid work and large gender differences in labour income, the age 
border for entering old age is higher for men. This is the case in Austria, Germany, 
Latvia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
4.2 Expected net transfers over lifetime
The size of gender-specific expected net transfer benefits over all life stages depend 
strongly on the valuation method. Measured in monetary terms, they amount to 7 YL 
for both men and women (Table 1, Column 7 and 8). Measured in terms of time, net 
transfers over lifetime are considerably higher for men, amounting to 14 TL for men 
and 8 TL for women. The imbalance between transfers received and transfers paid is 
remarkable and a consequence of the population structure with baby boom cohorts in 
working age.
In Austria, Germany, Sweden and the UK, women receive considerably larger 
expected net transfers than men. The gender differences are the effect of large gender 
differences in paid work, together the larger redistribution out of paid work activities. 
By contrast, Lithuania, Latvia, Italy, Spain and Slovenia are characterised by 
considerably lower net benefits of women compared to men. For Lithuania and Latvia 
this result is explained with public dissaving, resulting in low net contributions of men 
to the public transfer system. In Italy, Spain and Slovenia the net contributions of men 
are lower than for women because of the larger total amount of work done by women. 
Table 1: Net transfer benefits by type, life stage and gender measured in relation to the yearly labour 
income of a full-time worker
Young Work Old Age All stages Diff.
 W M  W M  W M  W M W-M
EU-15 16 17 -15 -15 6 5 7 7 0
Private market 6 5 0 -7 1 -1 6 -3
Non-market 7 8 -11 0 -2 1 -5 10
Public 4 3 -4 -8 6 5 6 0
Age border 23 24 62 62
Austria 16 16 -13 -20 7 8 10 5 5
Private market 5 4 1 -8 1 -1 7 -4
Non-market 7 9 -10 0 -2 1 -5 10
Public 4 3 -4 -12 8 8 7 -1
Age border 23 22 60 61
Belgium 13 13 -13 -15 5 4 5 2 3
Private market 4 3 -1 -5 2 -1 4 -3
Non-market 5 6 -8 -1 -1 1 -4 6
Public 3 3 -3 -9 5 4 5 -2
Age border 23 23 62 62
Bulgaria 19 21 -15 -12 4 3 8 12 -4
Private market 8 7 1 -8 3 -1 12 -1
Non-market 8 11 -12 1 -2 1 -6 13
Public 3 2 -4 -5 3 3 2 0
Age border 23 25 64 61
Germany 15 16 -11 -18 7 3 10 1 9
Private market 5 5 1 -7 2 -2 8 -5
Non-market 7 8 -9 -1 -1 1 -3 8
Public 3 3 -3 -9 5 5 5 -2
Age border 23 24 61 64
Estonia 17 17 -14 -15 5 4 7 7 1
Private market 6 5 0 -6 0 0 7 -1
Non-market 7 8 -10 0 -1 1 -5 8
Public 4 4 -5 -8 6 3 6 -1
Age border 22 23 63 60
Spain 18 19 -17 -10 4 7 5 16 -12
Private market 5 5 1 -7 2 -2 8 -4
Non-market 9 11 -17 2 -2 3 -10 16
Public 3 3 -1 -5 5 6 7 4
Age border 25 27 67 61
Finland 14 14 -15 -16 9 7 8 5 3
Private market 5 5 -2 -6 1 -1 4 -2
Non-market 5 6 -9 -1 -1 1 -4 6
Public 3 3 -4 -9 9 7 8 1
Age border 23 23     62 62     
Calculations of net transfer benefits by life stage are based on European NTA data (Istenič et al. 2016) and life 
table data (Eurostat 2017)
Table 1 (continued): Net transfers by type, life stage and gender measured in relation to the yearly 
labour income of a full time worker
Young Work Old Age All stages Diff.
 W M  W M  W M  W M W-M
France 13 13 -14 -15 7 6 6 4 2
Private market 4 4 -1 -7 1 -1 5 -4
Non-market 5 6 -10 0 -1 1 -6 8
Public 3 3 -3 -9 7 6 7 1
Age Border 23 23 66 61
Italy 17 18 -17 -15 4 8 4 11 -7
Private market 6 5 1 -8 1 -2 8 -4
Non-market 8 10 -15 3 -2 3 -9 16
Public 3 3 -4 -10 5 7 5 0
Age Border 25 26 63 60
Lithuania 16 18 -15 -8 5 3 7 13 -6
Private market 7 6 -2 -5 1 0 6 1
Non-market 6 8 -10 1 -1 1 -5 9
Public 4 3 -3 -4 5 3 6 2
Age Border 23 25 62 59
Latvia 16 17 -12 -8 3 3 7 12 -5
Private market 6 5 -1 -6 1 0 6 0
Non-market 6 8 -8 1 -3 0 -5 10
Public 4 4 -2 -4 5 3 7 3
Age Border 23 24 59 60
Poland 20 21 -16 -18 8 6 12 8 3
Private market 6 6 0 -9 2 0 8 -4
Non-market 9 11 -13 0 -2 1 -6 12
Public 4 3 -3 -8 8 5 9 0
Age Border 23 24 64 60
Sweden 13 14 -15 -20 8 6 7 0 7
Private market 4 4 -2 -6 1 -1 4 -3
Non-market 5 6 -8 -2 0 1 -3 5
Public 4 4 -5 -12 7 6 6 -2
Age Border 24 23 61 66
Slovenia 19 20 -18 -14 7 7 8 14 -6
Private market 7 6 -3 -6 1 -1 5 0
Non-market 8 9 -10 0 -3 2 -5 11
Public 5 4 -5 -8 8 7 7 3
Age Border 24 25 61 59
United Kingdom 16 17 -14 -19 8 5 10 3 7
Private market 5 5 1 -10 2 -1 8 -6
Non-market 8 9 -13 -1 -1 1 -6 8
Public 3 3 -2 -8 7 6 8 1
Age Border 21 24 61 64
Calculations of net transfer benefits by life stage are based on European NTA data (Istenič et al. 2016) and life 
table data (Eurostat 2017)
Table 2: Net transfer benefits by type, life stage and gender measured in relation to the yearly time used 
for paid work by a full-time worker
Young Work Old Age All stages Diff.
 W M  W M  W M  W M W-M
EU-15 24 26 -24 -20 8 8 9 14 -5
Austria 25 26 -22 -27 9 12 11 12 0
Belgium 20 20 -22 -21 7 7 5 6 -1
Bulgaria 26 29 -21 -16 6 5 11 18 -7
Germany 23 24 -19 -24 9 5 13 5 8
Estonia 25 27 -24 -20 7 6 9 13 -5
Spain 26 28 -28 -12 6 11 4 27 -23
Finland 21 22 -24 -22 13 10 9 10 -1
France 20 21 -24 -21 9 9 5 9 -4
Italy 27 29 -30 -19 5 12 2 22 -20
Lithuania 24 26 -23 -11 7 4 7 20 -12
Latvia 23 25 -18 -11 4 4 9 19 -10
Poland 28 29 -23 -24 11 8 15 13 2
Sweden 21 22 -24 -28 11 9 8 2 6
Slovenia 29 30 -29 -18 8 11 8 22 -14
UK 23 24 -22 -26 11 7 12 5 6
Calculations of net transfer benefits by life stage are based on European NTA data (Istenič et al. 2016) and 
mortality data (Eurostat 2017)
The gender-specific expected net transfers in money units are plotted in Figure 2. The 
expected net transfers for men are plotted to the left of the zero line, those of women to 
the right. The total (men and women) net transfers are represented by the total length 
of the bars, adding the values for men and women. Countries are ordered according to 
the total size of expected net transfers. The plot shows that the values for men 
determine the ranking of the countries. The countries at the bottom are those with the 
largest total net transfers and the largest values for men. The countries with the lowest 
transfer net transfers are those with men and women doing similar amounts of total 
work. In this group of countries we observe smaller net transfers for men, both relative 
to the values for women and in absolute terms. Explanations are the lower valuation of 
unpaid work and the high share of paid production distributed across generations and 
genders. In Sweden the net contributions of men are positive, financing part of the net 
transfers of women.
Figure 2: Expected net transfers over lifetime by country and gender 2010
4.3 A decomposition of public transfers in old age
Women receive higher public transfers in old age due to higher life expectancy. On the 
one hand, pension rules disadvantage women by ignoring their contributions to non-
market transfers. This results in a lower level of yearly pensions for women. On the 
other hand, women have a considerable advantage through the higher life expectancy 
in combination with a retirement age similar to men or even lower than that. 
Therefore, women are net receivers of public old-age benefits over a much longer 
period. In the previous section it was shown that these two types of inequalities largely 
balance out, so that total transfers received in old age are similar for men and women 
in most countries. 
We decompose the public net transfers received in old age into a level and a duration 
component. Table 2 shows the results. To define the age groups representing old age 
we rely on the sign of public net transfers. Women become net receivers of public 
transfer benefits between age 57 in Slovenia and age 64 in Sweden. For men the age is 
slightly higher and ranges from age 59 in Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and Slovenia to 65 
in Sweden. 
The average number of years spent as net beneficiary in old age is considerably higher 
for women in all countries. For women, the expected number of years receiving net 
transfer benefits in old age ranges from slightly under twenty years in Bulgaria and 
Sweden to more than 25 in Austria, France, Poland, Lithuania, Spain and Slovenia. For 
men the expected number of years spent as net beneficiary ranges from a little less 
than 12 in Lithuania and Latvia to over 19 in Spain and Italy. In the EU-15, women are 
net receivers of public benefits for about seven years longer than men, on average. A 
particularly large gender gap in the duration of the retirement period can be found in 
Lithuania and Latvia, reflecting the large differences in the life expectancy between 
men and women. 
The public transfer benefits are considerably lower for women in many of the analysed 
countries. In Austria the average yearly pension of men amounts to 44 per cent of YL, 
the average pension of women to 32 per cent of YL. Large gender differences of more 
than 6 per cent of YL and more are also found in Germany, Spain, Italy and Lithuania. 
However, the higher female life expectancy compensates for the lower yearly benefits. 
With the exception of Austria, total old-age benefits are higher for women in all 
countries. 
Table 3: Decomposition of net public benefits in old age in a level component and a duration 
component
Age Total No. Yearly Age Total No. Yearly
border benefits years benefits border benefits years benefits
in YL in % of YL in YL in % of YL
EU 16 France
Women 59 6 22.9 28 59 7.2 25.6 28
Men 61 5 15.8 31 60 6.0 18.8 32
Austria Italy
Women 58 7.9 25 32 60 5.8 24.2 24
Men 60 8.2 18.3 44 60 6.2 19.7 31
Belgium Lithuania
Women 59 5.0 23.7 21 59 5.3 20.4 26
Men 62 4.2 16.4 26 59 2.3 11.8 20
Bulgaria Latvia
Women 59 3.6 19.1 19 58 4.8 20.5 23
Men 60 3.1 12.7 24 59 2.9 11.7 24
Germany Poland
Women 60 5.3 22.5 24 55 8.4 25.3 33
Men 63 4.6 15.5 30 59 4.7 14.7 32
Estonia Sweden
Women 60 6.4 20.8 31 64 7.0 19.6 35
Men 61 3.4 12.2 28 65 5.2 15.3 34
Spain Slovenia
Women 59 5.5 25.8 21 57 8.1 25.4 32
Men 60 5.9 19.4 31 59 6.1 17.8 34
Finland UK
Women 61 9.2 22.3 41 60 7.2 22.5 32
Men 62 6.6 15.9 42 62 5.9 17.2 34
Age border: youngest age of the old age group with positive average public net benefits.
Total benefits: total public net benefits expected in old age. Product of columns yearly benefits and no. years.
No. years: number of years a person can expect to be a net beneficiary of the public transfer system.
Yearly benefits: average yearly benefits in % of the income of a full-time worker.
Source: Calculations of net transfer benefits by life stage are based on European NTA data (Istenič et al. 2016) and 
mortality data (Eurostat 2017).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we estimated the gender-specific net benefits of intergenerational 
transfers by life stages and over a lifetime, based on age- and gender-specific transfer 
patterns in 2010. The analysis considers all relevant types of current intergenerational 
transfers, including public transfers, private market transfers and non-market transfers, 
consisting of services produced by unpaid work. Not included are capital transfers, 
such as bequests. Furthermore, it accounts for gender differences in life expectancy.
Several gender patterns of intergenerational transfers are common to all countries. 
Because of their higher employment rates and higher labour income, men contribute 
more to the public transfer system and finance a higher share of the consumption needs 
of children. In contrast, women contribute more to non-market transfers by providing 
unpaid services to children and other household members. 
We used two different approaches for valuing unpaid work in relation to paid work. 
When using the average net hourly wage to value non-market transfers, we find that 
lifetime transfers across the EU-15 are gender-balanced on average. Using an 
alternative measure of total intergenerational transfers in terms of time, we find that 
women contribute considerably more of their time to the provision of intergenerational 
transfers than men, on average. The results differ, because the valuation in net hourly 
wages gives one hour devoted to unpaid work and non-market transfer a lower value 
than one hour devoted to paid work. The measurement in terms of time values the time 
used for unpaid work and paid work equally.   
In Spain, Italy and Slovenia, women contribute considerably more to intergenerational 
transfers over their lifetime, compared to men. The explanation is the considerably 
larger amount of time devoted to work (including paid and unpaid work) of women in 
these countries. In Lithuania and Latvia women contribute more than men, because in 
2010 men contributed particularly little to the public transfer system.  In general, paid 
work in Europe is more redistributive than unpaid work in the sense, that one hour of 
paid work results in higher transfers than one hour of unpaid work, on average. 
Austria, Germany, Sweden and the UK, for example, are characterised by gender 
equality in total time devoted to paid and unpaid work. Because of the much higher 
involvement of men in more redistributive paid work in these countries, we find 
considerably higher net transfer contributions of men, compared to women. 
In several countries the public transfer benefits in old age are characterised by 
considerable gender-differences. Since pension calculations are based on income and 
the contributions to the public transfer system, women receive lower yearly net public 
benefits than men in many countries. However, because of the higher female life 
expectancy and their longer retirement period, the total net public benefits received in 
old age are higher for women in most countries. Exceptions are Austria, Italy and 
Spain. Given the age-specific net transfers and mortality rates observed in 2010, the 
average number of years that men live as net beneficiaries of public transfers is about 
16 in the analysed countries. Women, however, can expect to live 23 years as net 
beneficiaries. The gender gap in the duration of the retirement period is particularly 
large in Lithuania and Latvia, reflecting the large differences in life expectancy 
between men and women in these countries. 
An important aspect of gender differences in pensions cannot be analysed utilising 
NTA data: gender differences in pensions partly reflect differences between couples 
with and without children, since the lower pensions of women are largely a 
consequence of lower labour market participation and lower income of mothers. 
Because resources are shared among couples, a large gender gap in yearly pensions 
also reflects a lower income of parents in old age, compared to childless couples. The 
degree to which the gender gap in yearly pensions reflects a family penalty remains a 
topic for future research. 
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Table A1: Net transfer benefits by type, life stage and gender measured in relation to the 
yearly time used for paid work by a full-time worker
Young Work Old Age All stages Diff.
 W M W M W M W M W-M
EU-15 24 26 -24 -20 8 8 9 14 -5
Private market 7 7 0 -9 2 -1 9 -4
Non-market 12 14 -19 0 -2 2 -9 16
Public 5 4 -4 -11 9 7 9 1
Age border 23 24 63 61
Austria 25 26 -22 -27 9 12 11 12 0
Private market 7 6 2 -10 2 -1 10 -6
Non-market 13 16 -18 0 -4 2 -9 18
Public 5 5 -6 -17 11 12 10 0
Age border 23 22 61 61
Belgium 20 20 -22 -21 7 7 5 6 -1
Private market 5 5 -2 -7 2 -2 6 -4
Non-market 10 11 -16 -1 -2 2 -8 12
Public 5 4 -4 -12 7 6 7 -2
Age border 23 23 64 62
Bulgaria 26 29 -21 -16 6 5 11 18 -7
Private market 10 10 2 -11 4 -1 16 -1
Non-market 12 16 -18 2 -3 1 -9 19
Public 4 3 -5 -7 4 4 3 0
Age border 22 25 65 61
Germany 23 24 -19 -24 9 5 13 5 8
Private market 7 7 1 -10 3 -3 11 -7
Non-market 12 14 -16 -1 -1 2 -5 14
Public 4 4 -4 -13 8 7 8 -2
Age border 23 25 62 63
Estonia 25 27 -24 -20 7 6 9 13 -5
Private market 8 7 1 -9 0 0 9 -1
Non-market 12 14 -19 0 -2 1 -9 15
Public 5 5 -6 -11 9 5 8 -1
Age border 21 23 64 60
Spain 26 28 -28 -12 6 11 4 27 -23
Private market 7 7 1 -9 2 -3 11 -5
Non-market 14 17 -28 4 -3 5 -16 26
Public 5 4 -1 -7 6 8 10 6
Age border 25 27 69 60
Finland 21 22 -24 -22 13 10 9 10 -1
Private market 7 7 -2 -8 1 -1 5 -3
Non-market 10 11 -16 -2 -1 2 -8 11
Public 5 4 -6 -12 13 10 12 2
Age border 22 23 63 62
Calculations of net transfer benefits by life stage are based on European NTA data (Istenič et al. 2016) and 
mortality data (Eurostat 2017)
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Table A1 (continued): Net transfer benefits by type, life stage and gender measured in 
relation to the yearly time used for paid work by a full-time worker
Young Work Old Age All stages Diff.
 W M  W M W M W M W-M
France 20 21 -24 -21 9 9 5 9 -4
Private market 6 5 -1 -9 2 -2 6 -6
Non-market 10 12 -18 0 -3 2 -11 14
Public 4 4 -5 -11 10 9 10 1
Age Border 22 24 69 61
Italy 27 29 -30 -19 5 12 2 22 -20
Private market 8 7 2 -11 1 -2 11 -6
Non-market 14 18 -28 4 -2 6 -16 28
Public 5 4 -4 -13 6 9 7 -1
Age Border 25 27 63 60
Lithuania 24 26 -23 -11 7 4 7 20 -12
Private market 9 9 -3 -7 2 -1 8 1
Non-market 10 13 -16 1 -2 2 -9 15
Public 5 5 -4 -5 7 3 8 3
Age Border 23 25 63 59
Latvia 23 25 -18 -11 4 4 9 19 -10
Private market 8 7 -1 -8 2 0 8 0
Non-market 10 12 -14 2 -4 1 -8 15
Public 6 5 -3 -6 6 4 9 4
Age Border 23 24 60 60
Poland 28 29 -23 -24 11 8 15 13 2
Private market 9 8 0 -13 2 -1 11 -5
Non-market 14 17 -20 -1 -3 2 -9 18
Public 5 5 -4 -11 11 7 12 0
Age Border 23 24 64 60
Sweden 21 22 -24 -28 11 9 8 2 6
Private market 6 6 -2 -8 1 -1 5 -3
Non-market 9 11 -15 -4 0 2 -5 9
Public 5 5 -7 -16 10 8 8 -3
Age Border 23 23 63 65
Slovenia 29 30 -29 -18 8 11 8 22 -14
Private market 9 9 -4 -8 2 -1 7 0
Non-market 14 16 -19 0 -4 3 -9 18
Public 6 5 -6 -11 10 9 10 4
Age Border 24 26 62 59
United Kingdom 23 24 -22 -26 11 7 12 5 6
Private market 7 6 1 -13 3 -2 10 -9
Non-market 12 13 -20 -1 -1 1 -9 13
Public 5 4 -3 -12 10 8 11 1
Age Border 21 24 62 64
Calculations of net transfer benefits by life stage are based on European NTA data (Istenič et al. 2016) and 
mortality data (Eurostat 2017)
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